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 Donagan's Spinoza
 Edwin Curley
 In an unpublished paper on "The History of Philosophy as a Disci-
 pline," which Barbara Donagan kindly sent me recently, Alan Donagan
 commented on the habit philosophers have of speaking of their prede-
 cessors in the present tense: "Hume says that . . ." "Hume's reasons
 for saying that are... ." Alan was commenting on J. G. A. Pocock's
 view that this shows a lack of real historical interest in your subject,
 that if you were thinking about your subject historically, you would,
 as historians do, use the past tense. What philosophers do betrays a
 desire to treat the great figures of philosophy's past as if they were
 our contemporaries. This may produce good philosophy; it does not
 produce good history.
 For all his historical sensitivity, Alan himself stands resolutely with
 the philosophers on the matter of what tense to use. He typically
 speaks of Spinoza's exposition of his views in the present tense. And
 I think he is right to do so. Some years ago I wrote a piece which I,
 borrowing from Lucian, called, "Dialogues with the Dead." The central
 theme of this piece was that if we are interested not just in what the
 philosophers of the past said but in what they meant by what they
 said, we have to constantly ask ourselves: Why does this person say
 this? Might he have had reasons for saying it which he did not make
 explicit? And what are the implications of his saying this? How would
 this person have responded to certain objections which occur to us,
 but don't seem to have occurred to any of his contemporaries, or at
 any rate, don't seem to have occurred to them in quite the same
 way? Doing history of philosophy, which for me essentially involves
 conducting a dialogue with dead philosophers, requires you to try to
 achieve a kind of identification with them, to try to imagine what they
 would say if they were present and able to answer your questions about
 their text. Any such exercise must, of course, be highly speculative,
 but it does have some constraints placed on it by the fact that the
 philosophers of the past left a record of what they did say in response
 to questions their contemporaries did ask. A good interpretation of a
 dead philosopher will respect that record and be guided by it.
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 From this perspective it's perfectly reasonable to speak of dead
 philosophers in the present tense. But I have to say that in writing
 this paper it felt a bit strange. I do speak of Alan in this paper in the
 present tense, as I speak of Spinoza in the present tense. But it feels
 uncomfortable in the case of Alan, whereas it does not feel uncomfort-
 able in the case of Spinoza. If it feels uncomfortable to you, too, I hope
 you will understand that I do it for a specific methodological reason.
 I've had one other stylistic quandary in writing this paper, and
 that is a problem of reference. I started out these remarks referring
 to Alan Donagan by his full name, and then switched to his first name.
 There is a printed version of part of the paper circulating which starts
 out referring to him by his full name, and then switches to his last
 name. That's the way we normally proceed in writing about other
 philosophers, unless the philosopher happens to be so famous that
 any use of the first name would be superfluous. But in this case it again
 feels slightly uncomfortable. If Alan Donagan were present among us,
 as I would like to imagine him to be, I would address him by his first
 name. So in reading the paper, where the written text reads "Dona-
 gan," I shall say "Alan," much in the way that piousJews, in reading the
 Hebrew Bible, say adonai when they encounter the Tetragrammaton,
 rather than yahweh. I hope it will not be thought irreverent to suggest
 this comparison between Alan Donagan and the Lord, but to some of
 us he was rather like a god. Often he seemed to know just about
 everything.
 Alan Donagan's Spinoza is a remarkable book in many ways, but
 perhaps its most remarkable feature is the great sympathy Alan Dona-
 gan displayed for his subject.' People who work seriously on Spinoza
 often feel a certain affinity for his philosophy; it is difficult to imagine
 investing the time and energy required to come to some understanding
 of Spinoza without first feeling that Spinoza had something to say
 which was both true and important. In one fundamental respect, at
 any rate, Alan Donagan did not bring that sense of affinity to his
 subject. He interprets Spinoza as a naturalist, that is as someone who
 believes "that nature exists in its own right, and needs no supernatural
 being to create or to sustain it" (p. xi), and he acknowledges candidly
 that he himself accepts "the supernaturalist [philosophy] presupposed
 by the Jewish and Christian faiths Spinoza repudiated" (p. xiv). Yet
 his approach to Spinoza is unfailingly sympathetic, in the best sense
 of that term. He refuses to take it for granted that we understand
 what Spinoza's texts mean, constantly questioning common readings
 of those texts, especially where a common reading might provide
 grounds for an easy dismissal of what Spinoza is saying. He is not
 1. Alan Donagan, Spinoza (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). Page refer-
 ences will be given in the text in parentheses.
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 uncritically sympathetic. If he thinks Spinoza has failed to prove his
 point, or has proved a point different from the one he set out to
 prove, he will not hesitate to say so. But he is always looking for a
 way of understanding the text which will enable us to see it as one
 which a reasonable, indeed, acute philosopher might have written.
 It is not unusual for contemporary writers on Spinoza to maintain
 a discreet silence about their disagreements with Spinoza's views or
 arguments. But it is very striking that someone who makes plain his
 disagreement with Spinoza about a fundamental point should take as
 his primary object helping "philosophers who aspire to work out an
 adequate naturalism to learn from the greatest of their naturalist pre-
 decessors" (p. xiv). Donagan reports that he had spent thirty-seven
 years studying Spinoza and that he had been studying Spinoza inten-
 sively during the last three of those years. He reports also that during
 that period he had often changed his mind about what Spinoza's
 teaching was, that "each change confirmed by later study" had led
 him to abandon some objection to Spinoza's teaching, and that he
 expected future study to lead him to an understanding of Spinoza's
 thought which would find it more acceptable than he then found it.
 This is remarkable testimony not only to Spinoza's capacity to fascinate
 us but also to Alan Donagan's commitment to following the argument
 where it leads. "I disagree with what I think you're saying," he tells
 Spinoza, "but I will devote a great part of my life to trying to under-
 stand you, since I have great respect for your philosophical intelligence
 and I think that your austere and tragic view of human life represents
 one of the few philosophies which might be true and which there is
 some reason to believe." (That's not a real quote, but it seems to
 capture Donagan's attitude.)
 In this article I want to explore the naturalism Donagan attributes
 to Spinoza, asking what its essential features are, why Donagan
 thought this particular form of naturalism might be true, and why he
 thought Spinoza was someone from whom twentieth-century natural-
 ists might learn, why he thought that Spinoza's naturalism, unlike that
 of today's naturalists, was not "culturally barren," or "evasive," or
 "contemptible" (p. xi). I think it's only fair to acknowledge that I
 approach these questions as someone who, like Spinoza and unlike
 Alan Donagan, rejects the supernaturalism of the Judeo-Christian
 tradition and thinks he accepts something like the naturalism of Spi-
 noza. I have a somewhat different view than Donagan does of what
 that acceptance comes to, since I have a somewhat different view than
 he does of what Spinoza's naturalism implies. But we also agree in
 many respects about the interpretation of Spinoza, and I shall be
 exploring both our agreements and our disagreements.
 Let us begin with the concept of naturalized theology, a notion
 Donagan uses to highlight the peculiar nature of Spinoza's naturalism.
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 In part what "naturalized theology" means is something negative: that
 as a naturalist, Spinoza rejects the God of the Judeo-Christian tradi-
 tion, that is, that Spinoza believes that nature, in order to exist, did
 not need to be created by a supernatural being and, indeed, that no
 supernatural being exists.2 In part what "naturalized theology" means
 is something positive: that, in some sense of the term 'nature', it is
 appropriate to regard nature as God. Spinoza's brand of naturalism
 does not give up the notion of God but seeks to show that nature has
 sufficiently many of the characteristics traditionally ascribed to God to
 make it reasonable to identify nature with God. In particular, Spinoza's
 brand of naturalism seeks to show that nature exists necessarily, is in
 a positive sense its own cause, is also the cause of everything other than
 itself, is absolutely infinite, and yet, though its essence is constituted by
 infinite attributes, is one being. If Spinoza can show that nature has
 these various characteristics, that will be sufficient to justify the use of
 religious language in connection with nature.3
 This way of posing the problem assumes that there are things
 other than nature, which nature causes to exist, and hence, that nature,
 in the sense in which it is to be identified with God, is not to be
 identified with the totality of finite things. Since people commonly use
 the term 'pantheism' to refer to the view that God is properly identified
 with the totality of finite things, this interpretation of Spinoza must
 reject the notion that Spinoza is, in that sense, a pantheist. Donagan
 does reject the propriety of calling Spinoza a pantheist (p. 90), and I
 believe he is right to do so. This is one of the points of agreement
 between us. If it seems to you a radical reading of Spinoza, I might
 mention that this is also a point of agreement between the two of us
 and the great French commentator Martial Gueroult. I don't mean to
 argue from authority here; I mention this only in the hope that people
 who find it unthinkable that Spinoza is not a pantheist will pause to
 consider what reason they have for this view.4
 2. So far as I can discover, Donagan does not define the term 'supernatural being',
 but by a supernatural being I shall mean a personal being, with knowledge of and a
 will concerning finite things, which has created all finite things and which has infinite
 power to carry out his will regarding the things he has created.
 3. So I take it to be the project of chaps. 4-6 of Donagan's book to reconstruct
 Spinoza's arguments for these claims about nature; I also take it that he thinks Spinoza
 will have made a strong case for his naturalized theology if he can provide good reasons
 for accepting them and that Spinoza in fact does give us arguments for these claims
 which provide some reason for accepting them. That is why Spinoza's is "one of the
 few philosophies ... there is some reason to believe" (p. xiv). Particularly relevant to
 this project are chaps. 4.1 (nature's necessary existence), 4.2 (nature's self-causation),
 5.2 (nature's absolute infinity), 5.3-5.4 (nature's unity), and 6.1-6.2 (nature's causation
 of finite things).
 4. Of course, if you treat Spinoza's metaphysics as the very paradigm of pantheism,
 so that 'pantheism' just means "whatever view Spinoza held about the relation between
 God and nature, and any view sufficiently like it," Spinoza will be a pantheist by defini-
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 What, then, do we mean by 'nature', when we say that nature is
 a necessary existent, a self-caused cause of all other things, etc.? Al-
 though I find Donagan clear in rejecting the idea that 'nature' here
 refers to the totality of finite things, I do not find him clear about
 what he does mean. Sometimes his positive statements suggest that
 he does, after all, think of nature, in the relevant sense, as the totality
 of finite things.
 Consider his account (in chap. 4, secs. 1-2) of the Spinozistic
 notion that nature is its own cause. One of the things Donagan and I
 agree about is that unraveling Spinoza's concept of causation is abso-
 lutely fundamental to understanding his philosophy. The fundamental
 antithesis in Spinoza is between substance and its modes. Substance is
 defined as what exists in itself and is conceived through itself; modes
 are defined as things which exist in something else and are conceived
 through what they exist in. In the Ethics, Spinoza does not explain
 what he means by the phrase "exist in," so the reader who knows only
 the text of the Ethics must work out the meaning of that phrase as
 best he can. There are various theories about this in the literature.
 For some thirty years now I have been arguing that for x to "exist in"
 y, for Spinoza, is for x to be caused by y. Not everyone has accepted
 that analysis, but Donagan does, with one minor qualification which
 need not concern us now.5
 So the question then becomes, What does Spinoza mean by the
 term 'cause'? This is again a term not defined in the Ethics itself,
 presumably because verbal definitions must always begin by taking the
 meaning of some terms for granted, and because Spinoza mistakenly
 thought that his readers would understand the term 'cause' well
 enough without a formal definition, just as he mistakenly thought they
 would understand the phrase 'exists in' without a formal definition.
 tion. I believe some histories of pantheism do take that approach, and it may be the
 right approach, if careful scrutiny of the philosophers usually labeled as pantheists
 suggests that on the more conventional definition of pantheism no one was a pantheist.
 5. See Donagan, chap. 4.4, on "the fundamental disjunctions." The minor qualifi-
 cation is that Donagan analyzes Ethics, pt. 1, axiom 1 ("Whatever is, is either in itself
 or in another") in terms of the notion of immanent causation and not of causation
 simpliciter. I consider the qualification minor for present purposes because Donagan
 does not need the distinction between immanent and transient causation to give his
 explanation of why nature is its own cause. I note also that, although Spinoza does not
 give us much help with "exists in" in the Ethics, he does gloss this phrase in the Treatise
 on the Emendation of the Intellect, sec. 92 (trans. in vol. 1 of the Collected Works of Spinoza,
 ed. Edwin Curley [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985]): "If the thing is
 in itself, or, as is commonly said, is the cause of itself, then it must be understood
 through its essence alone; but if it is not in itself, but requires a cause in order to exist,
 then it must be understood through its proximate cause". This explanation, note, does
 not make any use of the distinction between immanent and transient causation. I have
 to say that I think this is a good thing, because I don't find the distinction a clear one,
 either in Donagan or in Spinoza.
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 One of the points on which Donagan and I agree is that the best place
 to look for illumination about Spinoza's concept of causation is the
 Theological-Political Treatise, where Spinoza is trying to convey some of
 his fundamental metaphysical principles to a more general audience
 as a way of warming them up for the more rigorous but also more
 forbidding presentation of his philosophy which awaited them in
 the Ethics.6
 Donagan and I also agree that for Spinoza the crucial notion for
 understanding Spinoza's concept of causation is that of a law of nature.
 Here's an interesting passage from the Theological-Political Treatise
 which illustrates the connection: "Since nothing is necessarily true
 except by the divine decree alone, it follows quite clearly from this
 that the universal laws of nature are nothing but decrees of God,
 which follow from the necessity and perfection of the divine nature"7
 Donagan invokes this passage as one from which we can gather "the
 generic sense" in which Spinoza uses the term 'cause', and he argues
 from it to a definition in the following way: "Since what comes about
 through the will of God and what is caused by God are the same, it
 follows that the open sentence 'God causes x' is equivalent to 'God is
 such that it is a law of nature that if God exists then x exists or occurs,
 or will do so"' (p. 62). Donagan goes on to comment that, although
 this definition might seem to make the sentence "God is cause of
 himself" senseless, it does not really do so, that there is a way of
 understanding it in terms of the mechanical conception of nature.
 According to that conception,
 the things in the physical universe that come into being and pass
 away are not ultimate, but come to be and pass away in something
 that neither comes to be nor passes away. The atomists conceived
 this ultimate thing as a collection of atoms in an infinite void,
 and the things that come to be and pass away as configurations
 in the motions of those atoms. Spinoza preferred an alternative
 proposed by Descartes: that the ultimate thing is an infinite ex-
 tended plenum, in which various motions occur; and that the
 finite things that come to be and pass away are either simple
 bodies or persisting configurations of bodies distinguishable
 within that ultimate plenum by their states of motion and rest
 relative to one another. According to both versions of the me-
 chanical conception, it is a law of nature that what is ultimate
 neither came into being nor will cease to be. It can, therefore,
 be truly described as 'cause of itself', as Spinoza understood the
 word 'cause'. [P. 62; my emphasis]
 6. See my article, "The TTP as a Prolegomenon to the Ethics," in Central Themes in
 Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990).
 7. Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, in Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg:
 C. Winter, 1925), pp. 82-83.
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 This is one of the passages in Donagan's book which makes me think
 he has not completely freed himself from the idea that nature, in the
 sense in which nature is said to be its own cause, is the totality of
 finite things. "The ultimate thing" Donagan refers to here sounds
 suspiciously like the totality of finite things.8
 Other passages seem to confirm this impression. For example, a
 few pages later Donagan writes: "Since Spinoza nowhere claims that
 there is any self-contradiction in the idea of a perishable universe,
 consisting solely of things that merely happen to be, and are not
 immanently caused at all, he does not offer it as a logical truth. He
 expected his chosen readers, those who embraced the new mechanical
 conception of nature, to accept it as presupposed by that conception;
 and he confined his attention to them" (pp. 65-66). I take this to
 mean something like the following: if we understand the universe to be
 an entity consisting of all and only those things which merely happen to
 be, finite things which come into being and pass away, then Spinoza
 does not claim that it is (as we would say) logically necessary that the
 universe exists; but he does say (and would have expected those who
 embraced the new mechanical conception of nature to agree) that the
 universe is a necessary existent in another sense; for it is part of the
 new mechanical conception of nature that things which come into
 being and pass away do so because there is some law of nature which
 specifies the conditions under which they will come into being; the
 conditions we refer to here are always themselves things which come
 into being and pass away; in the language of Ethics, part 1, proposition
 28, they are things which are finite and have a determinate existence;
 no law of nature could specify the conditions under which the universe
 will come into being; anything referred to in the specification of those
 conditions would have to be included in the totality whose existence
 we were trying to explain; similarly, no law of nature could specify
 the conditions under which the universe will pass away, for precisely
 the same reason. So it is, in that sense, a law of nature that the universe,
 the ultimate thing, exists. That is the sense in which nature is a neces-
 sary, self-caused existent. And we can come to see this by analyzing our
 concepts of the universe and of a law of nature. The only substantive
 8. Surprisingly, in my view, Donagan will later identify the infinite Cartesian ple-
 num with (a) the absolutely infinite substance, (b) the immediate infinite mode under
 the attribute of extension (motion and rest), and (c) the mediate infinite mode under
 the attribute of extension (thefacies totius universe), regarding all of these definite descrip-
 tions as different ways of referring to the same thing, the first of which is fundamental,
 the other two being derivable from it "by linkage" (pp. 104-6). I do not see how this
 can be right, since the absolutely infinite substance is supposed to exist in itself and be
 conceived through itself, whereas the infinite modes, as modes, must exist in something
 else, through which they are conceived. I'm assuming that if a definite description of
 a refers to something which is F, and a definite description of b refers to something
 which is not F, then a is not identical with b.
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 assumption here is that whatever comes into being or passes away
 does so in virtue of a law of nature which specifies the conditions
 under which those events will happen.
 I put this interpretation of Donagan forward very tentatively. I
 am not at all confident that I have understood him. One reason for
 that lack of confidence is a passage later in the book, where he is
 denying that Spinoza is a pantheist, where he writes: "Since finite
 modes are not self-caused, their totality cannot be self-caused either"
 (p. 90). Still, the view I've attributed to him sounds close enough to
 what he explicitly says, and close enough to things I think Spinoza
 would agree to, that I'll work with this interpretation of him until
 someone shows me a better one. Would that he were still around to
 help me out of my perplexities!
 If this is right about Donagan, then I think Donagan got Spinoza
 wrong on the necessary existence of nature, however much some of
 those propositions may sound like Spinoza. One reason for thinking
 this is that I don't believe Spinoza could have reasonably expected
 his contemporaries who embraced the new mechanical conception of
 nature to accept this rationale for holding the universe to be its own
 cause. The sticking point, I think, would have been the assumption
 that whatever comes into existence must do so because a law of nature
 specifies finite and determinate conditions under which it will do so.
 I think Spinoza believed that and affirmed his acceptance of that
 proposition in Ethics, part 1, proposition 28. But I don't think the
 belief was anything like universal among his fellow mechanical philoso-
 phers. For it is incompatible with theism, understood as the belief that
 the totality of finite things came into being through the creative act
 of God, who is not finite and does not have a determinate existence.
 Most of the mechanical philosophers of the seventeenth century
 thought their mechanistic philosophy was compatible with theism. At
 any rate, Descartes, Gassendi, Boyle, and Locke, mechanical philoso-
 phers all, were all also theists. Of the leading mechanical philosophers
 the only one who I think would have agreed with Spinoza in denying
 the creation was Hobbes.9 So for most of the leading mechanical phi-
 losophers, that causal principle about how things come to be was not
 an essential part of their mechanical philosophy, or even compatible
 with other views they held.
 9. And Donagan would evidently not accept that interpretation of Hobbes, since
 he holds that "Spinoza was the first major modern philosopher to believe that nature
 exists in its own right, and needs no supernatural being to create or sustain it" (p. xi).
 I have defended my interpretation of Hobbes as an atheist in "'I Durst Not Write So
 Boldly' or, How to Read Hobbes' Theological-Political Treatise," in Hobbes e Spinoza:
 Scienza e politica, ed. Daniela Bostrenghi (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1992), pp. 497-593. It
 requires a Straussian reading of Hobbes of a kind Donagan was quite hostile to.
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 Another reason why I find this reading of Spinoza unsatisfactory
 is that it seems to me to lead to -a toning down of Spinoza's claims,
 which I think Spinoza would not have accepted. This appears when
 Donagan comes to interpret Ethics, part 1, proposition 7, which claims
 that "it pertains to the nature of substance to exist." Donagan notes
 (p. 71) that people commonly understand this as a claim that "it is
 necessary that there is a substance," but he contends that that is a
 misunderstanding of the proposition, and that all proposition 7 really
 entails is that "anything which is a substance is necessarily conserved."
 Since the notion of substance as, by definition, a self-caused being is
 integral to Spinoza's argument for proposition 7, this is the conclusion
 Donagan's theory of self-causation must lead to. But I think Spinoza
 would not be satisfied with this weakened interpretation of proposi-
 tion 7.
 If I did not think we could give a better Spinozistic explanation
 of the necessary existence of nature, then I might be more willing to
 accept Donagan's. But I think we can do better. On the reading of
 Spinoza I favor, the mistake is to suppose that Spinoza held the physi-
 cal universe to consist only of finite, extended, transient things or
 combinations thereof. If we were to give a general description of the
 whole of the physical universe, of a kind acceptable to Spinoza, I
 believe we would have to acknowledge the existence of things other
 than finite, extended things which come into being and pass away. I
 also believe that, although Spinoza would insist that the totality of
 finite, extended things is not itself a finite thing, he would not think
 our description of the physical universe was complete until we had
 mentioned another very important kind of thing.
 I am not sure how best to characterize this other kind of thing.
 In Spinoza's Metaphysics I referred to them as "nomological facts.'0 In
 subsequent writings on Spinoza I have avoided that terminology, partly
 because my intervening exposure to Collingwood has made me want
 to avoid sounding so anachronistic. The essential point can be stated
 in language which is not particularly anachronistic. I agree with Dona-
 gan that one of the key features of the new mechanistic philosophy
 of the seventeenth century was the idea of explanation in terms of laws
 of nature which specify the conditions under which certain changes will
 occur. It is clear, both from the Ethics and from the Theological-Political
 Treatise, that Spinoza thought nothing could happen in the physical
 universe which was. not explicable in terms of laws of physical nature
 and that he conceived of those laws as having the kind of logical form
 we nowadays think of laws as having, that is, as generalizations which
 10. Edwin Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
 Press, 1969).
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 state the conditions under which change occurs in nature.' I believe
 that Spinoza took a "realistic" view of those laws of nature, in the
 sense that he thought that, just as it was appropriate to describe state-
 ments about singular things as true, so it was appropriate to describe
 the laws of nature as true and that, just as the truth of a singular
 statement ascribing a property to an object required the existence of
 a singular thing having the property the statement ascribed to it,
 so the truth of a law of nature required the existence of something
 corresponding to the generalization.
 I find this to be indicated most clearly in a passage in the Treatise
 on the Emendation of the Intellect in which Spinoza contrasts the series
 of singular changeable things with the series of fixed and eternal
 things.12 It seems inevitable, and I believe it is correct, to identify the
 series of singular, changeable things with the totality of things which
 come into being and pass away, the things the Ethics will call finite
 modes. One of the things this passage seems to tell us pretty clearly
 is that the totality of finite things does not exhaust reality, that there
 are in the world things which are not finite and do not come into
 being and pass away. What might they be? In this passage Spinoza
 says three things about the series of fixed and eternal things which I
 find particularly significant: (1) that they have laws inscribed in them,
 "as in their true codes"; (2) that, though singular, they "will be to us like
 universals, because of their presence everywhere and most extensive
 power"; and (3) that if we really want to understand the series of
 singular changeable things, we must attend to the series of fixed and
 eternal things. I assert on this basis that the fixed and eternal things
 of the Treatise on the Intellect are whatever it is in reality which corres-
 ponds to the laws of nature. 'Nomological facts' seems a convenient
 11. If evidence is needed here, see particularly the preface to pt. 3 of the Ethics,
 and in the Theological-Political Treatise, ed. Karl Bruder (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1843-46),
 chap. 4, secs. 1-3, and chap. 6, secs. 1- 15. I would not have thought this worth
 mentioning had I not recently come across two articles in which it seems to be denied.
 See R. V. Mason, "Spinoza on Modality," Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 313-42,
 with particular reference to a sentence on p. 321: "The notion of general and particular
 truths is out of line with [Spinoza's] mature position in the Ethics and Curley is only
 able to cite a passage from the early Short Treatise to help his interpretation." See also
 R. V. Mason, "Spinoza on the Causality of Individuals,"Journal of the History of Philosophy
 24 (1986): 197-210, particularly pp. 202-3. I thought I had made rather heavy use
 of the Theological-Political Treatise in the book Mason is discussing. There is more talk
 about the laws of nature in the Treatise than in the Ethics, but I do not think the Treatise
 can be dismissed as an immature work, since it appears to have been written during
 an extended holiday Spinoza took from writing the Ethics, between 1665 and 1670, at
 a time when Spinoza had a nearly complete first draft of the Ethics, and a draft which
 does not appear to have changed much as regards the metaphysical parts of the work
 (i.e., pts. 1 and 2).
 12. Bruder, ed., secs. 99-101.
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 modern way of expressing that idea, though it is not, of course, a
 terminology Spinoza would have found immediately intelligible. (I
 think we could have explained to him what we mean by it in less than
 five minutes.)
 If it should be suggested that the Treatise on the Intellect is an
 early, immature work, much of which the mature Spinoza would have
 disavowed, I would agree. If it should be suggested that Spinoza aban-
 doned this aspect of the teaching of the Treatise on the Intellect,13 I
 disagree. I contend that the fixed and eternal things of the Treatise on
 the Intellect survive in the Ethics as the attributes and infinite modes.
 We do not properly understand Spinoza's ontology unless we under-
 stand him to hold that there is in the world something which does not
 come into being or pass away, and which is not to be identified with
 any combination of things which do come into being and pass away.
 One name Spinoza gives this eternal element in things is "the order
 of nature. "14
 I've just characterized the order of nature as an eternal element
 in things, and this may provoke some of you to say to yourselves,
 "Wait a minute. Nature, in the sense in which it is a self-caused being,
 is supposed to exist in itself, and other things are supposed to exist
 in it. How can you turn around and say that it exists in them?" For
 now I will just point out that Spinoza does endorse that kind of lan-
 guage when he takes as a motto for the Theological-Political Treatise the
 following verse from the New Testament: "By this we know that we
 remain in God and that God remains in us, because he has given us
 of his spirit" (I John 4:13; cited on the title page and discussed in the
 Theological-Political Treatise, xiv, 17). And I think that one reason he
 insisted on describing God as an immanent cause of things is that he
 wanted to emphasize the closeness of the connection between the
 order of nature and the things ordered.'5 We should not think of the
 eternal things in the world as existing in a Platonic heaven, separate
 13. As seems to be Mason's view in "Spinoza on the Causality of Individuals," p.
 202. Mason's argument there seems to be vitiated by a failure to attend to an important
 qualification in the statement of Ethics, pt. 1, propositions 21-23. They concern what
 follows from the absolute nature of God's attributes, i.e., what follows from them
 unconditionally. The infinite modes follow unconditionally from God's attributes. Finite
 modes follow from God's attributes only as those attributes are affected with some other
 finite mode, i.e., only if certain antecedent conditions are satisfied.
 14. See, e.g., the various passages listed in the glossary-index of Collected Works of
 Spinoza, s.v. ordo naturae.
 15. The proof of pt. 1, proposition 18 emphasizes that all things are in God, when
 it tries to show that he is their immanent cause. This is unhelpful, insofar as we want
 to explain their existence in God in terms of his causality. But I find the Dutch translation
 of causa immanens suggestive. The Nagelate schriften render this as inblijvende oorzaak,
 which is literally "a cause which remains in its effect."
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 from the things which come into being and pass away. They are an
 order which we can discern in the things which come into being and
 pass away.
 Suppose I'm right about this ontological point. My earlier attempts
 to show this do not seem to have persuaded Donagan, since the concept
 of an eternal order of things, distinct but not separate from the things
 ordered, does not play any role in his explanation of how nature could
 be self-caused.'6 Part of what I am trying to do in this article is to
 restate the argument in a way which I think might have persuaded
 him, focusing on existing points of agreement and moving from them
 to points on which we had not reached agreement when he published
 his book on Spinoza. Suppose I have succeeded, at least to the extent
 that Donagan would grant me this for the sake of the argument, to
 see where it might lead. How does recognizing this ontological point
 help us to understand why Spinoza might have thought of nature as
 a self-caused, necessary being?
 To see how, we need to think about how it is that this eternal
 order causes finite, changeable things. I take it as a point of agreement
 between Donagan and myself not only that the mechanical philosophy
 of the seventeenth century made the concept of a law of nature central
 to scientific explanation but also that, in some of its versions at least,
 it had the idea of the unity of the sciences, by which I mean, the idea
 that the laws of nature (or at least those laws dealing with the physical
 world) are capable of being organized into a deductive system, the
 axioms of which would state certain very simple and general truths
 about extended things simpliciter, and the theorems of which would
 state more complex truths dealing with particular kinds of extended
 things (projectiles, or the planets, e.g.). It certainly seems that Des-
 cartes had this idea pretty clearly, as appears in his Principles of Philoso-
 phy, and I think Donagan agrees with me about that.
 Now since Spinoza's Metaphysics I've been arguing that this deduc-
 tive organization of physical science had a model in Spinoza's ontology,
 that the attribute of extension is that fixed and eternal thing to which
 the most fundamental laws of physics correspond,'7 and that the infi-
 nite modes under the attribute of extension are those fixed and eternal
 things to which the derivative laws correspond. The eternal order
 causes change in the physical world in the sense that, whenever change
 occurs in the physical world, it will instantiate a law of nature, which
 16. Donagan does discuss the fixed and eternal things on p. 51, but he does not
 seem to attach the significance to them which I do. When he later discusses the infinite
 modes of the attribute of extension (pp. 102- 7), he identifies them (as he does substance)
 with the infinite Cartesian plenum. I've given an argument against this in n. 8 above.
 17. Conversations I've been having lately with Charles Huenemann would lead
 me to include here the fundamental assumptions of geometry as well. For Descartes
 and Spinoza there is not a sharp distinction between geometry and physics.
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 has the form of a generalization, the consequent of which describes
 in general terms some event involving a finite thing, and the anteced-
 ent of which describes in general terms some other, prior event involv-
 ing some other finite thing. Ordinary thinking about causality identi-
 fies the event instantiating the antecedent as the cause of the effect.'8
 Spinoza's conception of causality regards it as only a partial cause and
 insists that we regard the aspect of reality which the law of nature
 describes as (at least) equally necessary to the occurrence of the effect
 and, hence (at least) equally entitled to be regarded as a cause. I say
 "at least" here, because I think Spinoza regarded the series of fixed
 and eternal things as really a more fundamental cause than the series
 of singular, changeable things, perhaps because every member of the
 series of singular changeable things came into existence because of,
 and so owes its existence to, the series of fixed and eternal things,
 whereas the converse is not true.
 One attraction of this way of understanding causation in Spinoza,
 apart from the fact that it seems a possibly acceptable conception of
 causation, is that it permits us -to see how the causation of the finite
 is like, and how it is unlike, the causation of the infinite. There will,
 on this interpretation, be causation within the series of fixed and
 eternal things, reflected by the fact that the lower level laws of the
 unified science are deducible from the higher level laws. And in this
 respect the common claim about Spinoza, that he identified causation
 with logical necessitation, will be correct, though it will not be an
 obvious mistake for him to have done so. But although the finite will,
 in a sense, be deducible from the infinite, it will not be deducible from
 it in precisely the same sense in which one infinite and eternal thing
 is deducible from another. Particular events in nature will be deducible
 from the eternal order of nature only if we add to our description of
 the eternal order descriptions of prior particular events.
 Donagan seems to accept a good deal of this picture, including
 some of its more controversial aspects. So, for example, in discussing
 the sense in which Spinoza is a causal rationalist, he writes: "Like
 Descartes before him and all physicists after him, Spinoza believed
 that, given a law of nature, a statement of an effect worded in terms of
 that law will logically follow from a similarly worded statement of its
 cause. If he is a causal rationalist, it is in a sense that will offend few
 philosophers of science" (p. 75). This implies that finite modes of
 extension do not follow directly from the nature of the attribute of
 extension alone; nor do they follow from the nature of extension
 18. This is a simplification, of course. Ordinary thinking about causality is surely
 more complicated than that. I suppose that the theory John Mackie presented in The
 Cement of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) gives a good account of
 it. But for our purposes I think the simplification will do.
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 indirectly, by way of a chain of infinite modes of extension whose
 first member does follow directly from the nature of extension alone.
 Donagan accepts this consequence (p. 91). He also accepts that this
 implies a surprising element of contingency in Spinoza. In spite of
 Ethics, part 1, proposition 29 ("In nature there is nothing contingent
 . . ."), there will be a sense in which finite things are contingent. Spi-
 noza's necessitarianism, according to Donagan, "implies neither that
 all a finite body's properties are essential to it, nor that none of its
 properties can change, but only that the series of its actual changes
 constitutes its only possible biography" (p. 115). In Leibnizian terms,
 Spinoza does not believe that the actual world is the only possible
 world (cf. pp. 73-74). Any given finite mode will be necessary in
 relation to, because deducible from, the eternal order taken in conjunc-
 tion with the prior history of the world. But it will not be necessary
 in relation to the eternal order alone. Many readers of Spinoza are
 highly resistant to this conclusion because they are apt to interpret
 the necessitarian propositions in part 1 of the Ethics in an overstrong
 sense. Donagan recognizes that if we interpret those propositions in
 a way consistent with Ethics, part 2, axiom 1 ("From the order of
 nature it can happen equally that this or that man does exist, or that he
 does not exist"), we must admit the presence of a kind of contingency in
 the system.19
 What Donagan does not accept, it seems, is the ontological aspect
 of my interpretation. That is to say, he does not seem disposed to
 identify substance, or its attributes, with those fixed and eternal things
 described by the fundamental laws of nature, or the infinite modes of
 an attribute with the fixed and eternal things described by derivative
 laws of nature. And I can understand why he might resist that move,
 since my initial exposition of my interpretation was couched in such
 flagrantly anachronistic terms. It must have deeply offended his Colling-
 woodian sensibilities. So let me try to justify that aspect of my interpre-
 tation in terms which are not so anachronistic.
 It is a striking feature of Spinoza's ontology that his infinite modes
 seem to have no analogue in Cartesian ontology. Although Descartes
 uses the same fundamental metaphysical concepts of substance, attri-
 bute, and mode, he makes no distinction between infinite and finite
 modes. Presumably that is because all of his modes are finite. But the
 relationship between substance, or its attributes, and the infinite modes
 does have an analogue in the metaphysics of Plotinus. In certain re-
 spects the infinite modes stand to the attribute of which they are a
 19. I think I am right in stressing those passages in Donagan where he seems to
 be agreeing with my position on contingency. But I must admit there are some passages
 where I wonder, e.g., on p. 70, where he seems to explain the proof of Ethics, pt. 1,
 proposition 5, in a way which presupposes the deducibility of finite modes from the
 attributes of substance alone.
This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Mon, 20 Apr 2020 17:12:21 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 128 Ethics October 1993
 mode in a relation like that in which Nous and Soul stand to the One.
 They proceed from it necessarily and timelessly. And the infinite modes
 of the attribute of extension constitute a kind of connecting link be-
 tween the first principle and the constantly changing material world.
 The proximate causes of changes in the physical world are the lowest
 level elements in the eternal order, and the first principle is only a
 remote cause.
 There are disanalogies, of course. The One of Plotinus is sup-
 posed to be beyond the reach of human thought, whereas Spinoza
 claims that the human mind has an adequate knowledge of God's
 eternal and infinite essence. The One of Plotinus is supposed to be
 beyond description in human language, because perfectly simple,
 whereas Spinoza postulates a first principle which is not simple, but
 constituted by infinitely many really distinct attributes, at least two of
 which we can describe in human language. Still, the analogies may be
 more interesting for our purposes than the disanalogies.
 Spinoza may not have known much about Plotinus directly, but
 he did get a heavy dose of Neoplatonic thought in the synagogue as
 he was growing up. That is true, at least, if we can take the work of
 his teacher, Manasseh ben Israel, as representative of what Spinoza
 was taught in the synagogue. For some time now I have been recom-
 mending that students of Spinoza read Manasseh's Conciliator for the
 light it would shed on Spinoza's biblical criticism in the Theological-
 Political Treatise. One of the principal criticisms Spinoza makes of tradi-
 tional biblical interpretation in the Treatise is that it tends to import
 Platonic and Aristotelian ideas into scripture. If you read Manasseh,
 you will see that he is particularly prone to interpret scripture in terms
 of Neoplatonic ideas.20
 Imagine, then, the young Spinoza, schooled in a heavily Neopla-
 tonic version of theism, rebelling against it for a variety of reasons,
 and in his rebellion coming upon the philosophy of Descartes, which
 charms him because unlike the philosophy on which he was brought
 up, its central ideas are clear and distinct. Given this background, he
 20. In "The History of Philosophy as a Discipline" (1988) Donagan concludes that
 neither what he calls "historians' history" nor what he calls "philosophers' history" are
 defensible by themselves: "No classic philosophical text will yield its content to anybody
 who does not read it as a philosopher would-as an attempt to solve certain problems
 the nature of which cannot be understood without provisionally judging its soundness.
 On the other hand, it will seldom yield its content except to students who read it as a
 response to an actual intellectual situation that is most effectively approached through
 texts that are not philosophical masterpieces." This seems to me sound advice and I
 see myself as following it here. In emphasizing Manasseh I hope to be laying the
 groundwork for a kind of argument which Donagan might find more persuasive than
 he found anything I have previously written on this subject. The Conciliator was first
 published in Spanish in 1632, but can be read in an English translation by E. H. Lindo
 (London: Duncan & Malcolm, 1842).
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 will be particularly interested in the Cartesian theory of essences and
 in the Cartesian claim that we have, in mathematics, knowledge of
 certain true and immutable natures, natures which exist eternally,
 independently of their instantiation in the physical world. I have the
 idea of a triangle, and even if no such figure exists, or ever has existed,
 outside my mind, the essence or form of a triangle is immutable and
 eternal, since I can prove various theorems about the triangle. This
 essence is not something I have invented, since the theorems force
 my assent. My thought does not impose these necessities on things;
 rather, the necessities in things impose themselves on my thought.
 This is the teaching of the Fifth Meditation, and it is, of course,
 a very platonic sounding doctrine. But any good student of Descartes's
 writings knows that this element of Platonism in Descartes's thought
 creates problems when it is combined with theism. What is the ontolog-
 ical status of these essences? In Plotinus, where God, or the One, is
 not, strictly speaking, to be thought of as a mind, the forms or essences
 of things are contained in Nous, the eternal intellect which is the first
 emanation from the One. This is not something which is independent
 of the One, since it follows from it necessarily. In more traditional
 theistic philosophies influenced by Neoplatonism, such as the thomis-
 tic philosophy, God is a mind, and the essences of things are ideas in
 that mind. I believe that if Descartes ever gave any serious consider-
 ation to the Plotinian theory, he would have rejected it, because the
 God of Plotinus is not really a personal being. I believe he did consider
 and reject the thomistic conception of the status of essences, because
 he thought that ideas in the divine mind, as representations of an
 object, would require an object to represent. And since the ideas might
 be ideas of essences which are not ever instantiated, those essences
 could not be thought of as existing in objects which come into being
 and pass away. So if they were objects external to the divine mind,
 they would be something eternal and existing independently of God.
 The Fifth Meditation's talk of true and immutable natures raises the
 specter of an eternal realm independent of God, and prompted Gas-
 sendi to ask, in his objections to the Meditations, how there could be
 something eternal and immutable which is independent of God, com-
 patibly with God's omnipotence.2' Descartes's answer was that the
 essences of things, though eternal and immutable, were not indepen-
 dent of God, because God had willed them, as a king might will the
 laws in his kingdom.22 The laws of a king do not require the existence
 of acts of the kind they speak of, in order to be valid. All they require
 is that they be the edicts of the appropriate authority. Descartes ex-
 21. Descartes, Oeuvres, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin/CNRS,
 1974-86), 7:319.
 22. Ibid., p. 380.
This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Mon, 20 Apr 2020 17:12:21 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 130 Ethics October 1993
 plains their immutability and eternity by pointing out that the will of
 God, unlike that of human kings, is itself immutable and eternal.23
 Spinoza, I think, had some sympathy with the Cartesian critique
 of the thomistic solution. I think he believed that if we conceive of
 the ideas of essences as existing in a divine mind, then if they are to
 be true ideas, there must be an object distinct from that mind which
 they accurately represent. Which is to say that I think he was a realist
 about truth. On the other hand, I think he had very little sympathy
 with the Cartesian doctrine that the eternal "truths" which articulate
 the content of these immutable natures are merely expressions of
 God's will. Descartes understands the will as an ability to do or not do.
 To conceive the so-called eternal truths as expressions of the divine
 will is to say that they might have been other than they are. That, I
 believe Spinoza thought, is incompatible with regarding them as eter-
 nal truths, and that is destructive of science, which is knowledge of
 eternal truths.
 But I think Spinoza did not fear, as Descartes did, the postulation
 of an eternal order distinct from the divine mind. For though it might
 be distinct from the divine mind, it need not be external to God.
 Spinoza regards it as a prejudice to say that God cannot be an extended
 thing. For him extension is one of the attributes constituting the divine
 essence. So there can be eternal truths about the nature of extension
 in the divine mind, and they can have an eternal object external to
 that mind, without their being external to God, or in any way compro-
 mising the power of God. The divine mind I speak of, which Spinoza
 calls the infinite intellect of God, is an infinite mode in the attribute
 of thought.24
 The immediate purpose of this excursion into the background of
 Spinoza's doctrine of the fixed and eternal things has been to make
 it plausible that Spinoza should have thought of the eternal truths of
 science and mathematics as descriptive of an eternal realm which in
 some sense is part of what there is. But I believe this line of thought
 also helps to explain why Spinoza conceived of nature as a necessarily
 existing, self-caused thing. In the sense of the term 'nature' in which
 nature is causa sui, that term refers to this eternal order. And the
 entities which constitute this eternal order are entities which the philo-
 sophical tradition before Spinoza would have recognized as being, in
 some sense, necessary beings. The problem, for them, was how to
 23. See my article "Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths," Philosophical
 Review 93 (1984): 569-97.
 24. Although thought is an attribute of God, and God is a thinking thing (Ethics,
 pt. 2, proposition 1), even the infinite intellect must be regarded as a mode of God,
 and not as something pertaining to his essence (Ethics, pt. 1, proposition 31). I do not
 understand this, unless you count it as evidence of understanding to say that it appears
 to be a Plotinian element in Spinoza's thought.
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 reconcile their recognition of these necessary beings with the sover-
 eignty of a personal god. If we reject the idea of a personal god, then
 we are left simply with a realm of necessary beings, whose necessary
 being does not need to be reconciled with anything.
 I've spoken of these necessary beings both as forms or essences
 and as nomological facts. I take it that this is legitimate. For Spinoza
 (as for Descartes) the essence of a thing involves a proposition stating
 what its essential nature is, and it involves whatever other propositions
 follow from the essential nature of the thing. Spinoza thinks good
 definitions should be causal. So, for example, the proper definition of
 a circle is that it is a figure produced by the motion of a line, one end
 of which is fixed, the other end of which is moving. Whatever other
 truths follow from that definition tell you what is involved in the nature
 of a circle. In the case of natural kinds, we might now illustrate this
 view by thinking of a chemical element as being defined by a formula
 giving its atomic structure. That nature would entail (in conjunction
 with the other laws of chemistry) certain laws about how samples of
 that element would interact with other elements. In proportion as we
 find it plausible to think of those laws of nature as necessary truths,
 and also take a realistic view of truth, we should find it plausible to
 think of nature as containing a necessary order of the kind Spinoza is
 affirming when he asks us to acknowledge a realm of fixed and eternal
 things. So I think my way of reading Spinoza makes his philosophy
 more attractive both for his contemporaries and for ours.
 Why, then, does Donagan not find this reading acceptable? I
 conjecture that it is notjust a matter of my having stated my interpreta-
 tion originally in anachronistic terms, that he feels constrained to
 identify the infinite modes with the totality of finite things by a passage
 in Spinoza's correspondence. Tschirnhaus had asked for examples of
 infinite modes. Spinoza replied by giving two examples of infinite
 modes of extension: an immediate infinite mode, which Spinoza calls
 "motion and rest," and a mediate infinite mode, which Spinoza calls
 "the face of the whole universe."25 This latter phrase is quite mysteri-
 ous, but Spinoza does give us a clue to its interpretation, when in that
 letter he refers us to the Scholium to lemma 7 in Ethics, part 2, where
 he had explained how we can come to conceive the whole of nature
 as one individual, whose parts vary in infinite ways, without the individ-
 ual as a whole losing its identity.26 The assumption seems to be that the
 face of the whole universe must be this immensely complex individual
 thing, "the ultimate thing," as Donagan calls it.
 But I think we are not obliged to interpret this reference that
 way and that there are good reasons not to. First, the phrase "the face
 25. Letter 64, in Opera, 4:278.
 26. Opera, 2:102, lines 9-13.
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 of the whole universe" need not refer to that individual but to those
 features of that individual which enable it to retain its identity through
 change, that is, the constant relationships between its parts. Second,
 if we do interpret "the face of the whole universe" as referring to that
 individual, the ultimate thing, then we make trouble for ourselves
 elsewhere. The mediate infinite mode of the attribute of extension is
 supposed to follow from the absolute nature of the attribute of exten-
 sion, timelessly, logically, and without the need for any other cause.
 (That's what it means to say that the infinite modes follow from the
 absolute nature of a divine attribute [compare Ethics, pt. 1, proposition
 21].) If the mediate infinite mode of extension follows in that way
 from the attribute of extension, and if we identify the mediate infinite
 mode of extension with the totality of finite things, then the totality
 of finite things follows from the attribute of extension. I do not see
 how the totality of finite things can follow from the attribute of exten-
 sion without its being the case that individual finite things also follow
 from the attribute of extension. But Donagan denies that Spinoza held
 individual finite things to be deducible from the infinite. I think he is
 right to deny that. Unless he is prepared to attribute a grand inconsis-
 tency to Spinoza, he ought not to identify the mediate infinite mode
 with the totality of finite things.
 In this article, I have concentrated on Spinoza's naturalized theol-
 ogy, and in particular on the notion that there is a sense of the term
 'nature' in which nature is its own cause, a necessary existent, and the
 cause of all other things. These are the aspects of Spinoza's theory of
 nature which make it plausible for Spinoza to identify nature with
 God. I think one of the things which attracted Alan Donagan to Spi-
 noza's brand of naturalism was the fact that it was a kind of naturalism
 which still allowed us to talk meaningfully about God as a necessary
 being. Whatever differences we may have about the precise interpreta-
 tion of Spinoza's naturalism, I agree with Donagan that Spinoza's
 naturalism does this and that this is an attractive feature of his
 naturalism.
 I believe Donagan was also attracted by other features of Spinoza's
 naturalism: the fact that, on his reading, it offered a nonmaterialistic
 theory of human beings and that, on his reading, it offered a nonegois-
 tic theory of how human beings ought to conduct their lives. There
 is not the space here to explore these issues adequately, but I would
 be remiss if I did not say something about them, briefly.
 In Behind the Geometrical Method, I presented Spinoza's philosophy
 of mind as a materialistic one, emphasizing such features of his system
 as the following: that the essence of the human mind, for Spinoza, is
 to be the idea of an actually existing human body; that the human
 mind, though conceptually distinct from the body of which it is the
 idea (in the sense that the concepts in terms of which it is understood
 do not involve the concept of extension), is not really distinct from it
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 (i.e., cannot exist without it); and that the mind's capacities for action
 and its limitations are to be understood as a reflection of the capacities
 and limitations of the body of which it is the idea.27 So far as I can
 see, Donagan does not disagree with me about any of these features
 of Spinoza's theory, and the issue between us is whether a theory with
 those features is properly thought to be materialistic. It's true that
 Spinoza does not propose to analyze thinking in terms of concepts of
 the physical sciences or to replace the concept of thinking with con-
 cepts that can be so analyzed (cf. p. xi). But the question is whether
 that is enough to qualify his doctrine as nonmateralistic. It seems to
 me that the features of Spinoza's system we agree about give the
 materialist all he ought to want. But perhaps that's because I don't
 attach, to Spinoza's talk of the eternity of the mind, quite the signifi-
 cance Donagan does. His way of explaining that talk may make sense of
 it, may capture what Spinoza thought was salvageable from traditional
 religious theories of the afterlife. But so far as I can see, it still remains
 the case on Donagan's interpretation that the portion of the mind
 which remains after the death of the body is not the same person as
 existed before that death (cf. pp. 197-200).
 As for the issue of egoism, Donagan quotes a key passage from
 the scholium to Ethics, part 4, proposition 18: "Reason . . . demands
 that everyone love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really
 useful to him, want all that will really lead man to greater perfection,
 and absolutely, that everyone should strive as far as he can to conserve
 his own being." Donagan's comment is that, "if [this principle] is egoist
 at all," it cannot be egoist in the usual sense: "For it asserts that you
 cannot will your own advantage without willing what will lead man
 (not just yourself) to a greater perfection" (p. 164; my emphasis). I
 would make one small, but I think important, amendment to Dona-
 gan's paraphrase of that principle: "It asserts that you cannot rationally
 will your own advantage without willing what will lead man to a greater
 perfection." People can, and in Spinoza's view frequently do, will their
 own individual advantage without willing what will lead people in
 general to perfection. The Dutch preachers who, to increase their
 power over their fellow citizens, tried to suppress Spinoza's writings
 would have been a salient example in his eyes. They were irrational
 in doing so, because they promoted ignorance and social discord,
 which are to everyone's disadvantage. Spinoza's fundamental criticism
 of them is that they were not pursuing their own advantage very
 intelligently, and this seems to me to reflect a basically egoistic point
 of view.28
 27. Edwin Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
 sity Press, 1988).
 28. I have discussed this topic in a bit more detail in "A Good Man Is Hard to Find,"
 Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 65 (1991-92): 38-39.
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 If Alan Donagan was right about the possibility of personal im-
 mortality, we may some day have a chance to talk out our remaining
 differences of opinion about Spinoza. That would be very pleasant.
 But if the Church is right, that there is no salvation outside the Church,
 we may not have that chance, since he and I will presumably be in
 different places after death. Mark Twain said that we should prefer
 heaven for climate, and hell for company. Mark Twain did not know
 Alan Donagan.
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